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ABSTRACT 
One basic work of llASA project on 
En v ironmentally Compatible Energy 
strategies (ECS) is a detailed assessment of 
specific technologies that might play a role 
in sco~ing well, with respect to the conflicting 
ob1ect1ves of development and environmental 
protection. The result of this assessment is 
technology inventory, labelled C02DB 
(Messner and Strubegger, 1991 ). C02DB is 
a data base, implemented on Personal 
Computers, including technology 
descriptions , their en v ironmental and 
economic characteristics as well as 
information on technology diffusion 
(temporal and geographical) and transfer. 
Currentl y, C02DB contains information on 
more than 1400 technologies. 
A recent synthesis of ECS work in the past 
years was the creation, in collaboration with 
the World Energy Council (WEC), of long-
term global energy scenarios (WEC-1/ASA, 
1995). Among others, the llASA-WEC 
scenarios aim at assessing ho w these 
technolog ies might be put into w idespread 
use, to minimize the emission of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) and to serve the development 
of oll world regions . This paper describes 
selected results of the llASA-WEC scenarios 
and summarizes the basis on which they are 
built. In this way, readers can form their own 
opinion on the results . We begin by 
analyzing past energy-demand and supply, 
together with its most important 
determinants. The main aspect of their 
scenarios is that (i) fear of exhaustion of 
resources seems to ha ve been exaggerated 
in the wake of the oil price h ike of the 19 70's 
and (ii) each link of the causal chain between 
green-house gases emissions, climate 
change, and subsequent damage is not 
sufficiently understood to allow precise 
forecasting , and it seems wise for policy-
makers to act on the principal of making mid-
course corrections to their chosen energy 
strategies, on the basis of ne w knowledge 
and R & D for energy-efficient technologies 
1. HISTORY Of ENERGY INTENSITY 
The International Institute for applied 
Systems Analysis (llASA) is an 
interdisciplinary, non-governmental research 
institution located in Laxenburg near 
Vienna, Austria . The lnstitute's research is 
focu_sed on three central themes, (1) Global 
En v ironmental Change, (2) Global 
Econom ic and Technological Transitions, 
and (3) Systems Methods for the Analysis of 
Global Issues. One of llASA's projects that 
cuts. across themes (1) and (2) is the 
Environmentally Compatible Energy 
Strategies (ECS) Project, which focuses on 
the challenge of providing adequate energy 
services to a growing world-population while 
minimizing env ironmental impacts . The 
prime objective of ECS' work is a better 
understanding of the linkages between 
energy use, development and environmental 
impact, in particular global climate change . 
for a systematic view of the energy-system, 
its environmental impact in the past and in 
the future , it is useful to disaggregate total 
energy demand into components . following, 
e .g., Kaya (1991) , total carbon emissions 
can be represented by the following identity: 
CO,= cap. GDP• TPE •CO, 
cap GDP TPE 
where C01 Carbon emissions 
cap Population 
(1) 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
TPE Total primary energy 
demand 
:~h s .:d on_ pap i: r pr~ s .: ntcd at 2 0 t~ Internati onal Nathiagali Summer College on Physi cs and Cont emporary J\i:eds, June-Julv, 1995 
lnt.:rnat1 onal Institute for Applied Systems Analysis , Laxenhurg, Austria . -
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In this equation, total primary energy 
demand is conceptualized as the product of 
population, a measure of welfare (GDP per 
capita), and the primary energy-intensity of 
the economy. Emissions of carbon dioxide, 
the main energy-related greenhouse gas, can 
be thought of as the product of primary 
energy and its carbon intensity. Using this 
concept opens the door for using results of 
three scientific fields-demography, 
economics, and engineering- to explain and 
to project energy-demand and its aggregate 
en vironmental impact. We shall now look at 
the historical trends of each of the variables 
in turn . 
Global Primary Energy Consumption: 
Total global primary energy-consumption, 
including all sources of commercial energ y 
and fuelwood, has gro wn at an average 
annual rate of approximately 2% per year 
for more than one century (IPCC, 1996) . This 
gro wth corresponds to a doubling of 
consumption every 35 years . Including fuel 
wood in measuring total primary-energy is 
important for the assessment of the 
development of energy-intensity of GDP. If 
non-commercial fuels are omitted, the 
average energy-intensity can show 
potentially misleading rises over time . 
Population : Since the beginning of this 
century, global population has increased 
from 1.6 b illion to more than 5 billion, 
corresponding to an average annual growth 
rate of 1 . 3% (See e .g. Grlibler and 
Nakicenovic, 1994). 
Economic Growth: Long-term economic 
growth is best observed in industrialized 
countries . According to Maddison ( 1989), 
the average per-capita GDP in 32 
industrialized countries increased from 
US$(1980) 841 in 1900 to US$(1980) 3678 
in 1987, that is , at an average annual rate 
of 1 .7%. Population in these 32 countries 
grew at the same annual 1.3% as the global 
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population, so that total GDP in these 32 
countries grew at an average of 3% per year. 
Decarbonization : Since 1860, the carbon-
intensity of primary energy supply has 
decreased at an average annual rate of 
0 .3% (Nakicenovic et al., 1993) . Taking· this 
rate, together with long-term growth rates of 
primary energy consumption and GDP, we 
find that the carbon intensity of GDP has 
decreased at an average annual rate of 
1.3%. 
2. ENERGY INTENSITY OF GDP 
From the numbers presented so far we can 
derive a long-term trend of energy-intensity 
reduction of GDP of l % per year. This is the 
result of 3% economic growth and 2% 
growth of total primary energy demand. A 
more detailed picture of the development of 
energy-intensities is given in Figure 1. 
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Figure l: Primary energy (including wood) 
per constant GDP. Source IPCC (1996). 
Figure l not only shows a large variety of 
energy-intensities of GDP in different 
countries and at different times, but it also 
makes the distinction between two ways of 
measuring GDP. The conventional way is to 
measure GDP in US dollars, converted at 
market exchange-rates (expressed by the 
index mer). Since the conversion at market 
exchange-rate ignores differences in 
purchasing-power between d ifferent 
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economies, GDP in countries w ith high 
purchasing-power of the US dollar (or, 
equivalently, where prices are lower than in 
the US ), seems lower than the same kind of 
product produced in the US. Since GDP is 
the denominator in the definition of energy-
inte nsity, d istorting the GDP to the low side 
re s ults in misleadingly high values for 
energ y- intensity. Correcting con ventionally 
measured GDP for purchasing power 
(ex pressed b y the index ppp), therefore , 
makes a significant difference for the 
resulting energy intensities, as shown in 
Figure 1, in the Former Soviet Union (FSU ), 
South Asia (SAS), and Pacific Asia (PAS). 
Toking all curves in Figure 1 together, the 
general picture is one of ever-decreasing 
energ y-intensity, w ith significant differences 
between countries . Here, it is important to 
remember that we include non-commercial 
energy in our analysis . Other stud ies , e.g., 
Goldernberg et al. (1990), do not inculde 
non-commercial energy in their calculations 
of energy-intensity and, therefore, find peaks 
that are not visible on our graph . 
Numerical e xamples of a verage annual 
decline-rate of energ y-intensity, based on 
Figure 1 are given in Table 1. 
Table l : Average annual decline-rates 
of energy-intensity (%) . Source IPCC 
(1996). 
i Country :1913-1988 1970- 1988 
I 
I United Stales 
lu.K 
I -o .93 
- 1.32 
-1.76 
-2.59 
I Germany -1 .31 -1.58 
-0.93 -1.06 France 
-1 .30 -2 .73 i Japan 
Typical and long-term decline rates are 
between 1 and 1.5% per year. In periods of 
higher energy price (e.g during the seventies 
and eighties of this century) , we find higher 
rates . 
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As a further illustration of the difference 
between GDP measured at market exchange 
rates and the estimated purchasing power, 
we show extreme ratios between these two 
measurements in Figure 2 . 
France Germany Japan Switzerland China Nigeria 
•Exchange rates R PPP 
Figure 2 : Exchange rates and purchasing 
power ratios. Source : UNDP (1993) . 
The data presented in Figure 2 suggest that 
countries with higher per-capita GDP have a 
lower purchasing power in US dollar 
equivalents, and it can be expected that the 
price-level in countries with presently high 
purchasing power will increase, reducing the 
big differences between purchas ing power 
and GDP measured by conventional means, 
as shown in the figure. 
The change of purchase power over time has 
not only an effect on energy-intensity 
calculations but also on economic growth 
rates. If the purchasing power in a country 
like China decreases from its present value 
of more than 5 times the US value, then 
GDP growth-rates decrease, as a 
consequence, if GDP is measured in 
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purchasing-power equivalents rather than at 
market exchange rates . Since China is a big 
factor in any projections of future GDP and 
global energy-demand, these concepts play 
a crucial role in long-term global energy 
scenarios. Table 2 illustrates the divergence 
in GDP growth rates since 1971, using the 
market exchange rates and the purchasing 
power parity, for the Chinese economy. 
Table 2: Average annual rates of 
growth for China (%) 
i 
I 
! 
: 
I 
Period GPO at I GDP at Purchasing I 
Market Prices, Power Parity 
1971-81 5.32 I 4.31 
1981-91 8.73 I 6 .48 
1971-91 7.03 i 5.45 
3. CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATION 
BETWEEN ENERGY AND THE 
ECONOMY 
Thus far, we have presented a conceptual 
factorization of total energy-demand without 
talking about causal relationships. The mere 
concept of energy-intensity suggests a tight 
,-elation between energy-demand and 
economic output. Indeed, GDP is one of the 
two determinants included in all descriptions 
of energy-economy interactions. The other 
factor is energy price. The simplest 
conceptual model, describing energy-
demand, uses the price of energy and total 
economic output as the two independent 
explanatory variables . Two plausible but 
hypothetical assumptions lead to a 
functional form of this relationship. The first 
assumption is that the production of an 
additional unit of GDP requires the same 
energy-input as an average unit of GDP, that 
is, that GDP and energy-demand grow at the 
same speed . Second, assuming that energy 
-consumers operate with a fixed budget, a 
price increase of 1 % is assumed to lead to 
a decrease of demand by 1 %. These 
42 
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assumptions lead to the following formula 
E, GDP, p, 
-= --/- (2) 
Eo GDPo Po 
The subscript t expresses time, 0 a reference 
time, relative to which changes for the three 
variables are measured . In other words, 
energy-consumption growth is a direct 
function of economic growth and is inversely 
related to price changes. This literally 
translates the mathematicol formula into a 
verbal description. 
The first refinement of this simple equation 
is to introduce elasticities into the rigid 
relationship of formula (2). Elasticities are 
introduced by exponents that, depending on 
their size, either dampen or magnify the 
reaction of energy-demand to changes of 
production or price. The original formula (2) 
then becomes 
~ = A( GDP, )a •(~)fl 
Eo GD Po Po (3) 
Assuming income to be proportional to total 
production· (i.e. assuming that macro-
economic consumption is a constant share 
of total production), the exponent a is called 
income elasticity. For easier reading, the 
quotient of (2) was turned into a product in 
formula (3). As a consequence, p, the price 
elasticity, is normally negative. Since 
durable energy-consuming devices create a 
"lock-in" effect that makes it more expensive 
for consumers to respond quickly to price 
changes, a distinction is usually made 
between short-term and long-term 
elasticities. Numerical values are different in 
different situations, but -0 .2 and -0.5 are 
indicative values for short-term and long-
term elasticities, respectively. These express 
the fact that a 1 % price increase leads to a 
demand reduction of 0 .2% in the short term 
or to 0. 5% in the long term. These values 
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indicate that the first , "naive" assumption 
about a (negative) unitary elasticity is a far 
a way from what is observed in reality. 
To analyze the impact that energy-prices 
hove hod on energy demand in the past, we 
turn to Figure 3, showing the development 
of real energy and oil price in the US over 
more than 100 years. 
o~------------~---~ 
1800 , 820 1840 1860 1880 , 900 , 920 , 940 1960 1980 2000 
Figure 3: Real overage energy (lower curve) 
and oil prices (upper curve) in the US since 
1800. Source : Grubler (1990) 
The o verall picture of energy-price 
development in the US is one of a rather flat 
trend, with interspersed spikes . This picture 
is in distinct contrast to long-term trend of 
GDP development which, in most countries, 
show a persistent upward trend. In the light 
of formula (3), this means that influence of 
GDP growth on energy-consumption must be 
more sign ificant than changes of energy 
prices . Assuming a fang-term average zero 
growth of energy-price, in conjunction with 
the rough annual growth-rote of 3% far GDP 
and 2% of primary energy as above, we thus 
get an income elasticity of two-thirds . As in 
the case of price elasticities, this means a 
dampened effect of GDP changes on 
changes in energy-demand. Instead of the 
concept presented, that is, where a 
influences demand yja GDP other wgys of 
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decreasing energy-intensity can be 
formulated. Some modelers, for instance, 
prefer to include the same phenomenon as 
time-dependent and vary the coefficient A of 
equation (3) instead . 
Independent of the model used, the 
reduction of overall energy-intensity is the 
consequence of several causes . Among them 
are technological progress, which tends to 
make energy-conversion processes more 
efficient; econom ic structural change, which 
(at least in later stages of economic 
development) usually goes into the d irection 
of greater shares of less energy-intensive 
sectors, such as the service sector, and fuel 
switching, which is normally accompanied 
by a reduction of energy-intensity. 
4 . PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ENERGY-
INTENSITY REDUCTION 
To asses the prospects for future energy-
intensity reductions, it is useful to 
conceptualize the energy - system , 
distinguishing various energy-forms . Figure 
4 illustrates schematiclly the different levels 
of energy-conversion between primary 
energy sources and energy services. 
Energy Sy1t111m 
Energys.ctOI' 
: ;,:t~~::: I Gas Well Coal Mine U1amum OU W ell Agrolores1ry M>M 
I 
C§) _, Natura. Gas Coal Sunlight Uraruum O• Biomass 
I 
' COl'!Version 1 Power Plant Phorovo~aic Power Plant Re finery Melflanol : rect1no1o91n l CoU "'~· 
----r-
1 T=~s l Gas Grod Elecincrty E lectnc:1ty Electncrty 
'""' '""" 
G•~ G11d Grid 
~ ,., G" Electnerty Electricity Electricity Kerosene Mo,._,. 
I 
~ ! TecflnOI09'U I Furnace l.Jght Bulb o,~ Air Conart1oner Aircran AutomOblle 
--,--
Energy S.rtk:e 
-'---~,_) So ace lllumina t.Jon Cooking Soac:e Transoor- Transpor. Cona1t1oning Corn:11honing 
"""' 
tatron 
Figure 4 : Schematic representation of the 
energy system . Source : IPCC (1996) 
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The first important thing to note is that there 
is a long way to go between a primary 
energy-source and the purpose of energy 
end-use. In fact, there is a huge qualitative 
difference between, e.g . a barrel of crude 
oil and a person transported over a certain 
distance . As it turns out, also the quantitative 
difference is important in long-term studies 
of the energy-system and the question arises 
why, so often, primary (and not final) energy 
is used as an indicator of energy intensity. 
The answer is simply that primary energy is 
so much easier to measure, and that the 
difference in results is often negligible. 
Ideally, however, the relationship between 
final (instead of primal) energy and 
economic output should give a more 
accurate picture, in particular of energy-
systems that include a significant share of 
synthetic fuels (such as methanol or 
hydrogen) or solar energy. 
Looking at the energy-quantities flowing 
through the system, we find a total energy-
conversion efficiency between primal and 
useful of just under 30%. (see Figure 5) 
ENERGY CARBON CONTENT 
1
1
'1 :::~: !1r:s\1~~* \ • ' Ill • 0.2GIC / 
::1 1 D~l=~:;jJ ~,: 
I \ ; 385E.Jl.~ 
WASTE AND REJECTED CARBON DIOXIDE 
ENERGY EMISSIONS 
Figure 5: Major energy and carbon flows 
through the global energy system in 1990. 
Carbon flows do not include biomass . 
Source IPPC (1996) . 
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In order to judge whether these 30% are 
much or little, it is important to note that not 
all energy leaving the system, before 
performing the ultimate energy-service, is 
wasted, in the sense of being used without 
a good purpose . For instance, the efficiency 
of thermal electricity generation is limited by 
Carnot's Law which describes a theoretical 
upper limit of the thermal efficiency of 
power-generation. This efficiency is a 
function of the difference between the 
ambient and the process temperatures. 
Using a realistic but simple illustrative 
example of 300K (27°C) for the ambient 
and l OOOK (727°C) for the process 
temperature, the maximum efficiency 
according to Carnot is 70% (1-300/l 000). 
At the same time, some of the traditional 
uses of final energy can be replaced by heat 
transfer, for example a heat pump . 
Traditional energy-conversion efficiency 
would be a misleading indicator in such 
cases: the theoretical minimum energy 
required for providing a temperature of 30 
°C to a building where the outdoor 
temperature is 4 °C is one twelfth of the heat-
energy delivered to the indoors (IPCC 1996). 
These considerations of efficiency limits are 
useful for the calculation of theoretical limits 
to energy-efficiency of different energy-
conversion. In practice, the concept of Best 
Available Technologies (BATs) is a useful 
tool to estimate practical energy-saving 
potentials . Nakicenovic et al (1993) estimate 
that 40% of global energy use in 1990 
would have been saved by using BATs in 
every instance of energy conversion. This is 
still a theoretical consideration, but it tells us 
that the hypothetical instantaneous effect of 
introducing BATs is equivalent to more than 
50 years of continuation of the long-term 
trend of average energy-intensity 
improvement. (An annual reduction of 
energy-intensity of 1 % leads to a reduction 
of the base-year energy-intensity to 60% in 
51 years). 
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The BAT concept ignores costs, however, and 
an estimate of near-term realistic energy-
savings potentials must look at the cost of 
investing in energy-efficiency improvement. 
Estimates summarized in Nakicenovic et al 
(1993) suggest an economic potential of 
economic energy-savings in the Industrial 
and Residential/Commercial sectors of 13 
and 14% repectively. These figures must to 
taken as indicative only, because they rest on 
a number of assumptions that are debatable. 
Also, techno-economic potential cannot 
readily be translated into overall energy-
intensity reductions, as the discussion in the 
following section is intended to show. 
A more detailed example of an assessment 
of sectoral energy-savings potentials and 
their costs is shown in Figure 6. The figure 
shows the electricity-savings potential of the 
US buildings sector versus conservation 
costs for a range of discount rates. 
' 
" +;,or.::::.~'!'~ 
7< 
[, j ~-;:-9'·~~-~--
h 14 ~ T)'IX9~-kl' I --~?".""."_.J5_..Wll _ 
13 ~ 
' j!-J....Ei$~ 
Figure 6: Electricity saving potential of the 
US buildings-sector versus conservation 
costs for a range of (real) discount rates 
between 3% and 30%. Source: NAS (1991) 
The figure shows that the savings-potential 
depends crucialy 0;1 the discount-rate used 
in the calculation . The highest rate used for 
the illustration, 30% may seem very high. 
This may be so when compared with bank 
rates. In this example, discount-rates play the 
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role of a technical parameter that is varied 
to explain "user-behaviour" . This point is 
discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
5. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Without explicitly emhasizing it, we have 
shifted the discussion from energy-demand, 
as a function of economic output and price, 
to energy required to perform a given task. 
This has some methodological implications 
when it comes to forecasting energy-demand 
or to calculating costs of energy-saving and 
pollutant-emission reduction. 
First, we note that increasing the energy-
efficiency of a given task, in effect, reduces 
the energy-costs involved and therefore can 
be expected to have the same effect as an 
energy price reduction. According to formula 
(3) above, this can lead to an increase of 
energy-demand. This has been called "take-
back" effect . An example of this effect in 
action is given in Figure 7, showing that a 
more than 30% reduction of specific 
gasoline-consumption by US passenger cars 
between 1970 and 1989 did not achieve a 
reduction of total gasoline consumption. The 
offsetting factors preventing it were an 
increase of the total distances driven and a 
decrease of the average number of 
passengers per ride. 
P--.r..i.m~ .. --"" 
_;..--· (.-natet ...... 
01ta: ORNL-t110, 1!Kl2 
-lO 1990NPTS, 11192 
' \ 
Figure 7: Carbon emissions from US 
passenger cars. Source: Grubler, llASA, 
(1993), unpublished. 
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Another caveat is that for many consumers, 
energy-efficiency is only one of several 
often conficiting criteria for purchasing 
decisions . Passenger cars are an example 
that should make this point fairly obvious . 
From this discussion, it follows that the costs 
of energy-saving and pollutant-emission 
reduction can be estimated in two 
principally different ways. One is to 
calculate the cost of technical improvement 
("Bottom-Up") and the other method ("Top-
Do w n") is to regard energy-prices as a 
controlled variable (e.g. by assuming price-
reg u lation by taxes and subsidies), to 
estimate the functional relationship between 
price and demand, and to calculate 
aggregate output (GDP) losses as a 
function of an energy or carbon tax. 
It is clear that in the latter case of Top-Down 
analysis, reducing any reference energy-
demand incurs reduction costs . This view, 
normally attributed to economists, is 
illustrated in Figure B, compiled by 
Nordhaus (1991) . The figure clearly 
expresses the economists' paradigm that 
"there is no free lunch"; that is, any 
reduction of C07 emissions (or, equivalently, 
energy intensity) is accompanied by 
energy-price increases . 
Figure 8 : Estimated relationship between 
carbon emission reductions and energy 
price increases. Source : Nordhaus (l 991 ). 
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Nordhaus' curve is in clear contrast to the 
possibility of saving energy, emissions, and 
costs at the same time, as suggested by 
Bottom-Up studies such as the one 
summarized in Figure 6 . Even when 
considering that the two methods answer 
d ifferent questions , confusion may arise from 
the discrepancies between these two kinds of 
results , and thus not permit rational policy-
making . It, therefore, seems worth wh ile to 
probe these differences further. 
Observing the scientific and public 
discussions held on the subject, it may seem 
that these discrepancies may never be 
rconciled , but much of the differences of 
opinion about the size of potential savings 
are related to the question: Why are 
economically profitable energy savings 
potentials not realized by the consumers ? 
Or, in the economists' jargon: Why are free 
lunches not consumed ? We think tho! it is 
obvious that at least some of the "free 
lunches" are not consumed due to the lack 
of oppropriate information . It would be easy 
to lump these two reasons together under 
the label, transaction costs, but for policy-
making, aiming at energy-intensity 
reduction , these two reasons would seem to 
require different strategic approaches. 
From the descriptive point of view, it seems 
clear that market discount-rates are an 
inadequate tool for describing consumer-
behavior and that their indiscriminate use in 
analyses, therefore, underestimates costs 
and o verestimates potential savings . This 
conclusion is based on Hausman (1979), 
who calculated implicit discount-rates by 
observing consumer-decisions trading off 
initial investments against later savings, 
when purchasing air conditioners . His results 
are given in Table 3 . 
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Table 3 : Implied discount rates in 
purchases of air conditioners in US 
households . Source : Hausman (1979) . 
,----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
' Income Class Implied Annual I 
USS (1979) Discount Rate I 
per year (% ) 1 
6.000 89.0 
' 10.000 39.0 
15.000 27.0 
25 .000 17.0 
35.000 8.9 
50. 000 5. 1 
The y sho w that consumer behavior, 
particularly in low-income classes, is 
inconsistent with the assumption of personal 
discount rate that are of a similar size as 
bank rates. But not only private consumers 
can act as if their individual discount rate is 
ve ry high. According to Ross and Steinmeyer 
(1990), a typical criterion for US companies 
lo decide whet her they should invest into 
energy-saving measures or not is an 
estimated pay-back time of 2 to 4 years . This 
criterion corresponds to discount rates of the 
order between 25 and 50%. Regrettably, such 
high discount rates do not answer our 
question from above , whether real costs are 
overlooked in some calculations of energy 
savings potentials or whether they just reflect 
the lack of information. In either case, 
ho wev er, standard-setting is a policy tool 
that addresses the problem of promoting 
energy-efficient equipment at low or even 
negative extra costs . 
These points explain some of the differences 
bet ween the tw o types of modelling 
approaches . They do not account for all 
differences , but they characterize a main 
problem area . Being aware of these 
potential problems should identify the places 
at which judgment-both on the side of 
analysts describing potentials and the 
recipients of the results-enters the scene of 
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assessing concrete saving-potentials. If the 
purpose of assessing costs of energy saving 
is demand forecasting, it is important to 
realize that bottom-up savings potentials 
are usually static, that is they describe a 
theoretical situation at a given point in time. 
The observations presented abo ve suggest 
that a striaghtforward cost-calculation of 
supplying energy for a given task may miss 
some of the factors determining actual future 
energy demand . We, therefore, think that 
calculations of energy-savings costs that 
involve the specficotion of technical saving -
polentials ought to explicitly address the 
question of demand-forecasting, by 
including a discussion of time-paths that 
might lead to its realization . 
6. ENERGY RESERVES AND RESOURCES 
The history of estimating natural resources , 
in general, and energy resources, in 
particular, is characterized by a recurring 
concern about finiteness . In those cases 
where this concern was formulated as a 
projected date of exhaustion of a particular 
energy-reserve, the record of past errors is 
impressive . (See, for instance, Wildavsky and 
Tenebaum 1981 ). One reason for expecting 
impending exhaustion of primary energy is 
the lack of appreciation for the difference 
between resources and reserves. According 
to McKelvey (1972), reserves are that part of 
resources, that has been assured to exist in 
known places , and that can be economically 
recovered under prevailing prices. Gradual 
relaxation of the first criterion leads to the 
subeconomic resource-categories,. and 
relaxation of the second criterion defines 
hypothetical and speculative categories. 
From this definition, it is clear that reserves 
are the result of a dynamic process and that 
any price-increases or new geological 
information transfers a part of resources into 
reserves . 
An often-used and very suggestive indicator 
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Figure 9 : Development of oil reserves, 
cumulative consumption and reserves-to-
production ratio. Source : WEC-llASA (1995) 
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Figure 10 : Development of natural-gas 
reserves, cumulative consumption and 
reserves-to-production ratio. Source-WEC-
llASA (1995) . 
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Figure 11 :Categories of global natural-gas 
occurrences. Source: !SGS ( 1993). 
Gtoe Tern 110-12 cubic meters) 
2s.ooo~--------------, 
20,000 . 
15,000 
10,000 . 
5,000 
•Other occurrences iJ:J Gas hydrates 
20,000 
Figure 12 : Estimated global occrrences of 
natural-gas hydrates. Source: USGS (1993) . 
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of the size of energy-reserves is reserves-to-
production rotio. This hypothetical number is 
the result of di v iding, for o gi ven year, 
reserves of primary energy-carrier by its 
annual production . The reser ves-to-
production ratio is therefore give in years 
and expresses how long it would toke to 
e xhaust a gi ven reser ve under the 
a ssumpt ion of constant production . As we 
hove seen, this number is hypothetical in two 
respects, that is , neither production not 
reserves are constant over time . 
A practical aspect of the quantification of 
reserves is tho! the collection of primary 
information on reserves and resources is 
costly, and that the interest, on the side of 
producers of such information, in 
preciseness of the estimates is limited. As for 
as reserves are concerned, producers are 
mainly interested in the near to medium-
le rm and , as soon as product ion during a 
producer's planning - horizon is assured, 
further information is of little value. 
Let us now look at the recent development 
of two particularly important resources, oil 
and natural gos . Figures, 9 and 10 show 
cumulative consumption, remaining reserves 
and the reserve-to-production ratios for 
these two resources during the post fe w 
decades . For both resources, remaining 
reserves have multiplied in this time period, 
and the reserves-to- production ratios ha ve 
increased on the o verage . In particular, 
since the early 19 70s, the time of the first oil-
price increase, reserves of both oil and gos 
hove been increasing significantly. 
Looking more closely into the resource part, 
w e show estimates of some resource-
categories of natural gos in Figures 11 and 
12. The figures ore separated to show 
natural-gas hydrates (also known as 
"clothroles") resident in polar regions and in 
off-shore sed iment of outer continental and 
insular margins (Kvenvolden, 1993) in huge 
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quantities . Together, Figures 11 and 12 show 
that natural-gas reserves are less than l 0% 
of gas resources, excluding natural-gas 
hydrates , and that hydrates ore estimated to 
exceed the sum of all other categories by a 
factor of approximately 15 . 
Estimates of all fossil resources and of 
uranium ore summarized in Table 4. The 
table sho w s that oil-resources are of 
approximately the same size as gas 
resources, if natural -gas hydrates are not 
include in the latter. Coal resources ore 
more than 60% of the total fossil-resource 
base, as defined in table 4, and total 
geological occurrences of fossil primary-
energy are dominated by gas hydrates . 
The size of the natural uranium resources 
cannot be readily expressed in energy-units, 
because the amount of secondary-energy 
generated with uranium depends on the kind 
of technology used, for e . g., power 
generation. Tobie 4 uses two illustrative 
figures for each category of natural uranium 
resources . The first and lo w er number 
assumes the use of natural uranium for 
power-generation exclusively in conventional 
burner-reactors such as the Light Water 
Reactor. The second number assumes its use 
in advanced reactors such as Fast Breeder 
Reactors (FBRs) only. Such reactors can 
increase the power-output by a factor of 
approximately 60 in comparison to 
con ventional reactors . Together, these two 
numbers give a wide but illustrative range of 
the natural-uranium resource base. The 
estimates in Table 4 were the basis of the 
resource-a vailability figures put into the 
llASA-WEC scenarios which are presented in 
the following section. 
Renewable sources are not included in Table 
4 because they are unlimited for practical 
purposes . Only the role of their utilization 
and market-penetration is assumed to be 
limited. These limits are not explicitly 
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reported here . They can be found in WEC-
1 IASA (1995), but they can also be 
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work was done jointly with the World Energy 
Council (WEC) and was presented at the 
Table 4 : Global fossil and nuclear energy reserves, resources, and occurrences, 
in Gtoc . Source : WEC-llASA (1995) 
Consumption Resource Additional 
1850-1990 1990 Reserves , Resources• . Baseb ! Occurences 
' Oil I I 
I I '. .. C.oov 
! Unconventional I 1,900 
I 
i Natural Gas I I I I I ! Conventional' 41 141 279 I 420 
r-u--;,~ on v entianal i 192 258 I 450 400 ! 
J:iJ'drates ! I 18,7001 
: Coal 125 2.2 : 606 I 2,794 I 3,400 3,000 I ~tald 256 z Q: 1,282 3 8Q8 I 5 Q2Q 24 QQQ I 
' Uranium 17 0.5 i 57 203 I 260 150 
; in FBRs• 
- I 3,390 12, 150 15,550 8,900 
- negligible amounts; blanks, data not a vailable ' Includes natural gas liquids 
d All totals have been rouded 
• Fast breeder reactors 
0 Resources to be discovered or developed to reserves 
b Resource base is the sum of reserves and resources 
7 . LONG-TERM SCENARIOS OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL 
ENERGY SYSTEM 
The determinants of the long-term 
de velopment of the global energy system 
can be grouped into three areas : resources, 
technological progress, and demand . We 
ha ve discussed these categories here : 
resources and demands, explicitly, and 
technology, implicity, in the section on 
potentials for energy-intensity reduction . A 
synthesis of the research conducted by 
llASA's ECS Project in the past years in these 
three areas is the formulation of global long-
term energy and emission scenarios. This 
approximately inferred from the secnario-
results reported in the following section. 
50 
16th WEC Congress held in Tokyo in 1995 . 
The input assumptions determining the 
scenarios, also called scenario variables, are 
varied across ranges of plausible values. In 
one case, this principle was not followed, 
and a normative scenario resulted , in which 
the consequences of an unrealistically high 
degree of global cooperation aiming at 
achieving ambitious environmental goals is 
analyzed. The purpose of this scenario was 
to gi ve a quantitative illustration of the 
efforts required to stabilize global 
atmospheric concentrations below 450 
ppmv, a value well within the often-quoted 
doubling of pre-industrial le vels . In the 
remainder of this section, some key results 
of the llASA-WEC results are presented. (For 
a more detailed description, see WEC-llASA 
(1995)) . 
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Table 5 : A summary for three cases in 2050 and 2100 
A 
High Growth 
Population in 109 
2050 
2100 
GWP in l 0 12 US(l 990)$ 
2050 
2100 
Energy intensity improveme1t 
PE/GDP. %yr 
World ( 1990-2050) 
World (1990-2100) 
Primary energy demand, Gtoe 
2050 
2100 
Resource availability 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
Technoclogy cots 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
Technology dynamics 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
co2 emission constraint 
Carbon emission, GtC 
2050 
2100 
Environmental taxes 
10. l 
l l. 7 
100 
300 
Medium 
-1 .0 
- l.O 
25 
45 
High 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
No 
9-15 
7-22 
No 
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Case 
B 
Middle Course 
10.l 
l l. 7 
75 
200 
Low 
-0.7 
-0 .8 
20 
35 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
No 
10 
14 
No 
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c 
Ecologically Driven 
10.1 
11.7 
75 
220 
High 
-1.4 
-1 .5 
14 
21 
Low 
High 
High 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Yes 
5 
2 
Yes 
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The geographical basis of the llASA-WEC 
scenarios is a disaggregation of the globe 
into 11 w orld-regions. Although most 
scenario-results are described in 11-regional 
detail, the WEC-llASA report presents mainly 
global totals and aggregat ion of the 11 
regions into three "macro" world regions: 
OECD, Reforming Economies (of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union), and 
Develop ing Countries . Here, we will restr ict 
oursel ves to looking at global aggregates. 
The llASA-WEC scenarios are divided into 
three sets . High Growth (A ), Middle Course 
(B ), and Ecologically Driven (C). The main 
characteristics of these three sets are 
summarized in Tobie 5 . 
Cose A represents a future of ambitiously 
high economic growth-rotes, a fa vourable 
geop o lit ical development, includ ing largely 
unimpeded international trade . High 
economic gro wth (at a global annual 
a verage of 2 .4 % between 1990 and 2100)is 
assumed to facilitate a comparatively rapid 
turno ver of capital stock, thus allowing 
techno logical progress and economic 
structural change (l e ading to a relati ve 
increase of less energ y-intensi ve service-
sectors world w ide) to permit continuing 
reductions of aggregate energy-intensity at 
an average annual rate of 1% between 
1990 and 2100. 
Case B incorporates m o re modest economic 
development (an annual a verage of 2.1 % 
per year) and some what less optimistic 
assumptions about energy - intensity 
reduction (0.8% per year averaged), but like 
Case A, it assumes the expansion of 
international trade as the consequence of the 
demise of trade-barriers. 
Cose C, the normati ve of the three cases 
assumes that global environmental 
protect ion will drive policy-making world-
wide. Unprecedented international 
cooperation thus leads to a high degree of 
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environmental protection and international 
equity. Unrealistic as Case C may seem, it 
quantifies a specific set of efforts that would 
lead to a reduction of global carbon 
emissions by two-thirds of their 1990 value 
by the year 2100 . (2 instead of 6 billion tons 
of carbon per year) . 
To limit the variability between the cases 
and to enhance their comparability, all three 
cases are based on identical assumptions 
about global population growth . According 
to these assumptions, the global population 
saturates belo w 12 billions, passing 10 
bi llion just before the middle of the next 
century. Another common feature of the cases 
is that they assume a reduction of the 
income-gap between industrialized and 
presently de veloping world-regions. The 
mechanism w ith w hich this income-
discrepancy is reduced is included in the 
guiding principle of projecting economic 
growth more than 100 years into the future . 
In the llASA-WEC scenarios, it was assumed 
that GDP growth-rates are a decreasing 
function of per-capita GDP, that is, world 
regional GDP gro wth decreases with 
increasing wealth in that world-region . This 
dependency is summarized in Figure 13 . 
Total global primary energy-consumption 
for all three cases in shown in Figure 14 . As 
an insert, the figure also shows the world 
population . Both graphs show the historical 
de velopment since 1850 and the 
projections through the year 2100 . 
Average annual growth over the whole time-
horizon of primary-consumptions is slower 
than the long -term historical trend in all three 
cases, that is, 1.5 % in Case A, 1. 2% in Cose 
B, and 0.8 % in Cose C. Much of this 
reduction of growth-rates occurs in the 
second half of the next century. 
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Figure 13 : Economic growth -rates in relation 
to per capita GDP. Historical data for 
selected countries and ranges for the three 
llASA-WEC cases in three macro world 
regions. Source: W EC - llASA (1995). 
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Figure 14: Global primary energy use, 
1850 to present, and the three cases to 
2100, in Gtoe, Insert : Global population, 
historical and projected . Source :WEC-llASA 
(1995). 
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In terms of primary energy-supply structure, 
Scenario A I might be the most realistic of the 
three scanarios of Case A. In contrast to A2 
(in w hich coal is the dominant primary-
energy carrier) and A3 (relying more on 
nuclear and renewable energy than the other 
scenarios of all cases), A I assumes 
technological progress to favor developing 
the vast potential of conventional and 
unconventional oil and gos-occurrences. The 
main result presented in this picture is that , 
e ven w ithout including gas hydrates, a 
scenario can be defined that relies to 40% 
on oil and gas as primary-energy carriers 
for more than l 00 years to come . 
At scenario 
100 
80 
c 60 
" 
" " 0.. 40 
20 
1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100 
Figure 15: Evolution of primary energy 
shares 1850-2100, scenario Al. Source: 
WEC -llASA (1995) . 
Case B consists of a single scenario . 
Consistent with its more cautious 
assumptions about economic growth, the 
additions to oil and gas reserves are 
assumed to develop at more modest rates 
than in A 1, and coal is gaining an 
increasing share of all fossil fuels . Figure 16 
shows the evolution of primay energy shares 
in Case B. 
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CaseB 
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Figure 16: Evolution of primary energy 
shares 1850-2100. Scenario' B. 
Source: WEC-llASA (1995) 
Cose C includes two scenarios, Cl and C2; 
these two scenarios differ with regard to 
nuclear energy. C 1 reflects the more 
conventional "green" perspective of nuclear 
energy to be undesirable and, therefore , 
includes a phase-out of nuclear energy by 
the year 2100. In contrast, C2 assumes that 
nuclear energy can make an 
environmentally and socially accepted 
contribution to global primary-energy 
supply, e.g., by a newly developed 
decentralized and inherently safe conversion-
technology. Here, we show the evolution of 
primary-energy shares in Scenario Cl in 
Fiqure 17. 
'100 ••• 
80 
c 60 
" ~
" Cl. 40 
20 
0 
1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100 
Figure 17 : Evolution of primary energy 
shares 1850-2100. Scenario C 1. 
Source: WEC-llASA (1995) 
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Scenario C2 has a similar structure of 
primary-energy shares as Cl, the main 
difference being a share of nuclear energy 
that slowly grows to 20% by the year 2100. 
Note that absolute total primary-energy 
consumption in Case C is much lower 
(approximately 50% in the year 2100) than 
in Cose A and that, therefore, the shares in 
Figure 1 7 correspond to correspondingly 
lower absolute numbers of resource-
consumption. 
Fossil primary energy-resource consumption 
in all llASA-WEC scenarios is summarized in 
Figure 18. Expressed as shares of the 
respective resource-base (reserves plus 
estimated resources of Table 4), neither oil 
nor gas consumption exeeds 80% until the 
year 2100 in any of the scenarios . Note that 
natural-gas hydrates were not included into 
the resource-base of any of the six scenarios . 
By the end of the next century, five scenarios, 
that is all except the coal-intensive Scenario 
A2 ,use less coal than the presently estimated 
reserves. 
Solid 011 
•A1 R A2 CJA3 •e GJc1 Dc2 
Figure 18: Cumulative extraction of fossil 
resources in six llASA-WES scenarios. 
Source: WEC-llASA (1995) 
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Summarizing the environmental impact of 
the 6 llASA-WEC scenarios, we show in 
Figure 19, th global atomospheric C0 7 
concentrations and temperature change 
between 1950 and 2100. Both of these 
variables can be projected only with 
su bstantial uncertainties , even w hen the 
energy-related co2 emissons are known 
exactly. For example, uncertainties 
surrounding the increase in temperature 
expected for Scenario B, the central indicator, 
wit h regard lo these aggregated indicators 
of environmental impact, cove r the middle 
values of all s ix scenarios; the emissions 
lead to doubling of pre-industrial co7 
concentrations by the year 2100 and an 
estimated global temperature change of 
2°C. The highest environmental impact is in 
the coal-intensive Scenario A2, as could be 
expected. The highest-growth Scenario A3, 
which relies heavi ly on nuclear and biomass, 
has significantly lo wer carbon-emissions 
than the middle Scenario B. By design , 
global atmospheric co2 concentrations in 
Case C peak belo w 450 ppmv. Remaining 
below this limit should keep the global 
a ve rage temperature from rising by more 
than 1.5 °C. 
700 
600 
> ~ 500 
a. 
2000 2050 2100 
Figure 19 : Global atmospheric CO 
concentration (ppmv), 1950-2100, anJ 
global mean temperture change (0 C), 1990-
2100. The model uncertainties are indicated 
for Case B only. Source WEC-llASA (1995). 
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8 . CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented the 
h istorical development of the main 
determinants of energy demand, a view of 
the present situation of golbal energy-
resources and global scenairos of economic 
de velopment, energy supply, and its 
environmental impact over more than a 
century into the future . The main aspect of 
the scenarios is that the fear of their 
exhaustion seems lo ha ve been generally 
exaggerated in the wake of the oil price 
hikes of the 1970s. Today, the development 
of further energy-sources appears to be less 
contained by their physical occurrence than 
by the carrying capacity of the global 
environment. The question whether this is 
good news or bad news is fraught with 
considerable uncertainty. Taking global 
climates as example, each link of the causal 
chain between greenhouse-gases emissions, 
climate change, and subsequent damages is 
still not understood in a way that permits 
precise forecasts . 
For policy making, it would seem wise to act 
on a precautionary principle that allows mid-
course correction of a chosen energy-
strategy, should new scientific knowledge 
suggest that damages due to energy-
conversion are expected to be significantly 
different from what they were assumed to be. 
Reasonable as this principle may sound, 
there is much disagreement around the world 
as to exactly what policies would be the 
result of its proper application. One class of 
policies that reflect the precautionary 
principle is the "no-regrets" policies. This 
class comprises those policies that pay off 
in any case, that is, they are economically 
attractive, even without including the 
environmental damges as externalities into 
the calculation. Whatever these may be in 
given situation, it seems clear that research 
and development of more energy-efficient 
technolgoies will have to play a major role 
in the pursuit of such policies. 
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General considerations quoted in this paper 
indicate that the theoretical potential of 
technological progress is still very high . 
Effo rts lo lap it promise lo continue the 
historical trend of energ y-intensity reduction 
for many decades lo come . 
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